IRLF 


1012 


1012 


OF  ^ 

^IFOK^O^ 


A  STUDTTTT  BATTLE 
FORMATION 


Monograph  No.  6 


Prepared  in  the 

Historical  Branch,  War  Plans  Division 
General  Staff 


February,  1920 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1920 


WAR  DEPARTMENT 

No.  1012 
Office  of  The  Adjutant  General. 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

,  WASHINGTON,  April  28,  1920. 

The  following  "Study  in  Battle  Formation,"  prepared  in  the  Historical  Branch, 
"War  Plans  Division,  General  Staff,  is  approved  and  published  for  the  information  of 
all  concerned. 

[062.1,  A.  G.O.] 
BY   ORDER   OF  THE    SECRETARY     OF   WAR'. 

PEYTON  C,  MARCH, 

General,  Chief  of  Staff. 
OFFICIAL: 

P.  C.  HARRIS, 

The  Adjutant  General. 


--51438 


PREVIOUS  PUBLICATIONS  IN  THIS  SERIES. 


Mono- 
graph 
No. 

Title. 

War  De- 
partment 
Document 
No. 

1 

A  Survey  of  German  Tactics  1918 

883 

2 
3 

Economic  Mobilization  in  the  United  States  for  the  War  of  1917  
A  Handbook  of  Economic  Agencies  of  the  War  of  1917  ... 

885 
908 

4 

A  Studv  in  Troop  Frontage  

992 

5 

Cambrai 

1017 

A  STUDY  IN  BATTLE  FORMATION. 


1.  Definition  of  formation  and  purpose 

of  this  study. 

2.  Formation,  as  evidenced  by  organi- 

zation and  tactics  in  the  American 
Army  before  the  war. 

3.  Formations  in  first  four  combat  di- 

visions sent  overseas  as  evidencing 
and  determining  American  forma- 
tions in  the  war. 


4.  Formations  in  1st  Division. 

5.  Formations  in  2d  Division. 

6.  Formations  in  26th  Division. 

7.  Formations  in  42d  Division. 

8.  Formations  in  27th  and  30th  Divi- 

sions. 

9.  Formations  in  other  Divisions. 

10.  General  discussion. 

11.  Conclusions  as  to  a  sound  formation. 


1.  Definition  of  Formation  and  Purpose  of  this  Study. 

The  definition  of  the  word  '  'formation"  in  a  military 

,,,*,       -,.        ...         f   .  »/-i\     T,    •  Funk  &  Wag- 

sense    IS        the    disposition    of    troops.     (1)       It    IS    in    pre-  nails'     Standard 

cisely  this  sense  that  it  is  used  in  this  work.  The  study 
of  battle  formation,  therefore,  is  the  study  of  the  dis- 
position of  troops  in  battle. 

Innumerable  volumes  have  been  written  on  the  em-  0fT1wa^rinFochS 
ployment  of  troops  in  battle.  In  all  sound  works  the  condii?/of  Wa° 
disposition  is  considered  as  a  governing  factor  in  the  chap.xn,  s. 
employment.  (2)  When  so  much  eminent  authority  on 
the  subject  exists  it  would  be  superfluous  to  attempt  any 
general  discussion  of  the  principles  of  the  disposition  of 
troops.  This  is  especially  true  in  that  the  war  with  Ger-  Wa 
many  exhibited  the  same  general  features  as  have  marked  L(3) 
all  other  wars.  (3) 

A  brief  exposition,  however,  of  the  battle  formation 
actually  used  by  American  troops    in  the    war    with 
Germany  may  be  of  value.     Aside  from  the  remote  pos- 
sibility of  American  participation  in  another  great  war 
in  the  immediate  future,  there  is  a  present  necessity  for 
reorganization    of    our    continuing    military    forces.  (4)  of 
Troop  formation  is  as  inextricably  bound  up  in  organi- 
zation  as  it  is  in  employment  of  troops,  (5)  and  battle  m^n 
experience  will  undoubtedly  have  weight  in  the  reor-^ 
ganization  scheme.     General  principles  of  troop  forma-  3-<g>e  or.0f  com 
tion  are  sufficiently  stated  in  reports  of  the  high  com- 
mand  in  the  war  with  Germany  to  enable  authorities  files»  A-  E 
charged  with  reorganization  to  lay  the  grand  lines  of  the 
scheme.  (6) 


°uChisf 
19>  p- 


6  A   STUDlr   I_ST  BATTLE    FORMATION. 

Alsu  nuipy  officers  charged  with  the  details  of  reor- 
ganization will  have  their  personal  knowledge  of  battle 
formations  to  work  from.  Individual  officers,  however, 
with  few  exceptions,  can  not  be  fully  informed  of  de- 
tailed battle  formation  in  the  American  Expeditionary 
Forces  as  revealed  by  a  study  of  the  mass  of  original 
.  documents  in  existence.  Few  officers  are  properly  placed 
with  sufficient  time  to  consult  these  documents,  which 
as  records  of  actual  experience  are  the  best  authority  on 
the  subject.  For  the  rest,  Col.  Ardant  du  Picq,  an  au- 
thoTity  on  the  psychology  of  war,  in  his  "Etudes  sur  le 
<7>  Combat  "(7),  says  "*  *  *  nothing,  especially  in  the 

trade  of  war,  is  forgotten  sooner  than  experience.  So 
many  fine  things  can  be  done,  beautiful  maneuvers 
executed,  ingenious  combat  methods  invented  in  the 
musings  of  the  office,  or  on  the  maneuver  field." 

2.  Formations,   as   Evidenced   by  Organization   and   Tactics,  in  the 
American  Army  before  the  War. 

There  was  no  actual  tactical  organization  of  the  United 
^'States  Army  before   the  war. (8)     A   theoretical  paper 
o*  organization  into  divisions  based   on  study  of  foreign 
the  uajSted°sfates!  armies  was  formulated  before   1914.    This  formulation 
9)  visualized  the  incorporation  of  the  minor  tactical  units 
actually  in  existence,  but  was  self -evidently  merely  a 
makeshift  necessary  in  a  non-military  country  not  yet 
animated   by   a  national   desire  for  provision   against 
war.  (9) 

renj^jcf,1  ap-     With  the  progress  of  the  European  war  an  apprecia- 
•i9i6V(?o) June  3'tion  of  the  necessity  for  military  organization  grew  on 
the  country,  and  in  1916  an  act  was  passed  increasing 
and  providing  for  the  organization  of  the  military  forces 
sta'te?  A^ra'TM  tne  nation. (10)     Tables  of  organization  based  on  this 
1917,  p.  39.(ii)   'act,  prescribed  the  composition  of  units  as  large  as  In- 
fantry divisions,  which  were,  however  to  be  divisions  of 
three  Infantry  brigades.  (11) 

Witn  the  entlT  of  tne  United  States  into  the  war  the 
rSan^za^ion  °f  Infantry  divisions  for  expeditionary  duty 
changed  to  include  two  Infantry  brigades  of  two 
regiments  each.  (12) 

c Report ojc.^in     This   organization  was  further   amended  before   the 
plid  uai20  i918jentlT  of  American  troops  into  battle.(13)     The  organ- 
ization actually  used  by  the  fighting  unit,  the  American 
A  Ti9is  (H) 3cries  Division,  m  ^ne  war  with  Germany  was  as  follows: (14) 


A   STUDY   IN   BATTLE   FORMATION. 


Table  1. — Infantry  division  (combat)  maximum  strength. 
(Series  A.    Aug.  27, 1918.) 


1. 

2 
3 
4 
5 
G 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 

13 

Units. 

Table 
No. 

Approximate  strength. 

Offi- 
cers. 

Enlisted 
men. 

Total. 

Division  headquarters 

2 
3 
11 
9 
29 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 

50 
524 
220 
16 
52 
15 
15 
38 
16 
2 
51 

238 
16,426 
4.841 
379 
1,695 
473 
359 
1,295 
485 
82 
900 

288 
16,950 
5,061 
395 
1,747 
488 
374 
1,333 
501 
84 
951 

2  Infantry  brigades  

1  Field  Artillery  brigade 

1  Machine-gun  battalion.. 

1  regiment  of  Engineers  

1  field  signal  battalion 

Train  headquarters  and  military  police 

Ammunition  train 

Supply  train  ...        .                 

Knejineer  train 

Sanitary  train  

\ggregate 

999 

27,  173 

28,  172 

Final  report  C. 

A.  E.  p., 

>       14~15' 


The  organization  of  superior  units  and  of  independent  lll^>ri°AityIfcheF" 
units  was  prescribed  as  published  in  Tables  of  Crganiza-H.B.fiies.cis) 
tion,  Series  A,  1918,  and  for  units  larger  than  a  corps 
followed  the  lines  of  an  organization   laid  down  in  a 
priority  schedule  prepared  at  G.  H.  Q.,  A.  E.  F.(lo) 

Minor  tactics,  before  the  war,  were  laid  down  in  the  drill 
regulations  of  the  various  arms.  The  mechanics  of 
minor  tactics  were  naturally  fitted  to  existing  organiza- 
tions and  consequently  varied  somewhat  from  the 

.  •  . 

tactics  employed  in  the  war  with  Germany.     The  pnn- 

1  .      !  -Ill 

cipals  and  essentials  prescribed,  however,  proved  sound,  (is) 
(16) 

The  principal  arms  which  assumed  formations  on  the 
battle  field  were  Infantry,  the   machine-gun   arm,    and 
Artillery.     The    Tank    Corps(17)     and    troops    of    the    w.,  P.  7e.(i7) 
Chemical  Warfare  Service  (18)  either  had  limited  oppor-    ReportofSupe. 
tunities   or  served   as   auxiliaries.     Engineer  regiments  5crA°?ri9  Ai9i9* 
normally  were  used  for  special  purposes.     When  used  in  cnies,  A.  E.F. 
combat  they  were  used  as  Infantry.  (18) 

In  Infantry  minor  tactics,  before  the  war,  the  battalion 
was  the  combat  unit.  The  principle  of  its  employment  pp-  78-89-(19> 
was  to  bring  it  properly  organized  to  the  enemy  without 
undue  losses.  This  involved  the  use  of  a  formation  to 
keep  the  battalion  organized  and  in  hand  until  the 
necessity  for  avoiding  loss  required  deployment.  A 
battalion  support  was  provided  for.  The  same  principles 
applied  to  higher  Infantry  commands  to  include  the 
brigade.  (19) 


8  A   STUDY   IN   BATTLE    FORMATION. 

faS?r™andCavai"     Pre-war  machine-gun  minor   tactics    enunciated    the 

maScB'  'Sacwnc  principle  that  the  machine  gun  was  not  a  fourth  arm, 

Rme,  1915,  p.  43.  b^  an  auxiliary.  (20)     The  machine-gun  arm  was  recog- 

(2?)'  °f  °''  1918-nized  in  the  organization  which  governed  throughout  the 

Re      ofSu  e  waT   ^^h    Germany.  (21)     However,    the    tendency    in 

nor  Board,  A^E.  battle  to  incorporate  machine  guns  into  the  Infantry 

'E'F'arm  was  recognized  in  the  A.  E.  F.  in  France.  (22) 


governmg  purpose    of    pre-war  Artillery  minor 
m  assistmg  the  advance  of  the  Infantry  was  to 
iv,  pp.  9-n.(23)  secure   unity   of   direction    of   Artillery   fire,    which   is 
characterized  by  the  ease  with  which  it  can  be  shifted. 
This  unity  was  favored  by  keeping  units,  especially  the 
battalion,  concentrated,  and  by  employment  in  general 
of  no  smaller  unit  than  the  battalion.  (23) 

Pre-war  combined  or  major  tactics  were  based  on  the 
PP.  74-76.  (24)      principles   that   Infantry   decided   the  issue   of  battle; 
that  Artillery,  light  and  heavy,   existed  to  assist  the 
Infantry  by  fire;  that  Engineer  or  other  special  troops 
id.,  p.  79.  (25)    were  t0  be  used  as  Infantry.  (24)     They  required  the 
fire  action  of  the  machine  gun  without,  however,  giving 
to  that  weapon  the  prominence  it  later  attained.  (25) 

3.  Formations  in  the  First  Four  Combat  Divisions  Sent  Overseas,  as 

Evidencing  and  Determining  American  Formations  in  the  War 
with  Germany. 

The  basis  existing  before  the  war  with  Germany  for 

formations  to  be  adopted  in  war  has  been  indicated  in 

the   preceding   numbered   paragraph.     It   will   be   seen 

cInnc1AIErtF0ftnat  formations  were  changed  and  improved  during  the 

P.  i4.(26)          '  progress  of  the  war  as  experience  dictated.     The  fullest 

advantage  was  taken  of  the  experiences  of  our  allies, 

and  the  training  of  the  first  divisions  sent  to  France  was 

begun  in  close  association  with  the  French  Army.  (26) 

These  divisions,   the  1st,  2d,  26th,  and  42d,  following 

their  early  experience  with  French  armies,  participated 

id.,  pp.  32,  42  in  many  of  the  major  operations  of  the  American  forces 

(27),  and  the  formations  they  adopted  influenced  forma- 

F.  o.  NO.  2,tions  adopted   bv   subsequently   arriving   divisions.  (28) 

90th       Division,  *  .*••-  •  •         i  ..    .   . 

Au£.i9,i9i8.  H,Tne  development  of  formations  in  these  first  divisions 
therefore  offers  the  most  fruitful  field  for  study. 

4.  Formations  in  the  1st  Division. 

c.S^SJSV*!     The  first  complete  occupation  of  a  sector  by  American 

P.  i9.(29)  troops  was  the  occupation  of  the  Ansauville  sector  north 

of  Toul  by  the  1st  Division  in  January,  1918.  (29)     This 

occupation  was  ordered  by  the  French  1st  Army,  and 


A  STUDY   IN   BATTLK    FORMATION.  9 

naturally  followed  French  customs.     The  Infantry  for- 
mation was  one  brigade  in  line,  one  brigade  in  reserve  in 
the  training  area.     The  regiments  of  the  brigade  in  lineFr?nch°istArm8y' 
were  abreast ;  the  right  regiment  with  one  battalion  in  line,  ^vision  Journal 
one  in  regimental  support,  and  one  in  reserve;  fhe  left  c/^fSIs™"^!' 
regiment  with  two  battalions  in  line,  one  in  regimental (30) 
reserve.     The  division  Engineer  regiment  was  not  treated 
as  an  Infantry  force,  and  only  work  was  required  of  it.  (30) 
The  division  machine-gun  units  were  merely  required  to    inst.  NO.  5.  op. 
relieve   the  French  machine  guns.  (31)     The  di visional 
Artillery  was  merely  required  to  relieve  the  French  Artil- 
lery  and  occupy  prepared  or  designated  positions.  (32)  A*E>F-(31 
This  was  a  period  rigidly  restricted  to  defense  in  con-    693/3>  French 
templation  of  a  German  offensive.  (33)     The  occupation  S,DjturJnai  "f 
of  divisional  defensive  sectors  was  exactly  laid  down  in  BPvisKn'fiies! 
French  regulations  for  French  divisions,  later  published  G"3;A'E'F-(32) 
for   American   use. (34)     The   first  formations    adopted    Final  report  of 

,-1          f  i  •    i          ,.          i      •        -n  7i          C.inC.,A.E.  F., 

therefore  have  no  especial  national  significance,  as  they  p.is.(33) 
appear  to  have  been  dictated  by  the  necessity  of  fitting 
the  American   divisional  organization  into  the  general  fjj 
French  defensive  scheme.  794,1918.  (34) 

A  characteristic  formation  in  the  1st  Division  ap-  j^visk^May i o* 
peared  during  its  tour  in  Picardy  following  the  German  ^1  |^g}  'G-3» 
offensive  of  March  21,  1918.  In  anticipation  of  a  further 
German  offensive  on  Amiens  a  counter  offensive  was 
prepared  although  it  never  became  necessary  to  execute 
it.  The  infantry  formation  ordered  for  the  1st  Division 
was:  Brigades  abreast;  regiments  abreast;  right  regi- 
ment, battalions  in  depth;  right  center  regiment,  two 
battalions  in  line,  one  in  support;  left  center  regiment, 
two  battalions  in  line,  one  in  reserve;  left  regiment,  bat- 
talions in  depth.  This  approached  the  later  normal  for- 
mation of  the  1st  Division,  although  still  showing  French 
influence.  Batteries  of  machine  guns  for  indirect  fire 
were  provided  for,  to  be  organized  from  the  division 
machine  gun  battalion  and  from  machine  gun  units  with 
Infantry  reserve  battalions.  Orders  showed  an  habitual 
attachment  of  machine-gun  companies  to  Infantry  bat- 
talions. (35)  This  followed  French  custom (36),  in  oppo-  Tableaux  d'Ef- 

,,          A  .  .  ft-  fectifs,  G.  S.  Col- 

sition    to    the   American   organization   of   machine-gun  iege  Library. (36) 
companies  into  separate  battalions.  (37)     The  Artillery  A,Ti9i8. (37) S<a 
formation  ordered,  contemplated  three  groupements,  and  a 
reserve,  each  including  both  75's  and  155's.(35)     This 
showed    a    French    tendency    to    constitute    temporary 
tactical  units  in  place  of  using  existing  organizations ;  at 

1  7QQ490 OH 9 


10  A   STUDY   IX   BATTLE    FORMATION. 

the  same  time  it  showed  a  tendency,  more  apparent 
later,  to  assign  Artillery  organizations  to  support  Infan- 
try organizations  within  the  division.  Orders  for  tanks 
assigned  tank  units  to  accompany  and  support  Infantry 
organizations (35)  and  so  far  their  mission  as  prescribed 
in  this  division,  under  French  command,  was  analogous 
CI'  to  that  prescribed  for  accompanying  guns  when  American 
divisions  began  to  fight  under  American  high  command. 
.  (38) 

'can-     The  first  actual  offensive  operation  of  the  1st  Division 
p!e£(39)V'2°'1918'was  against  Cantigny.(39)     This  was  a  local  operation, 
,' 'Ma1? ?o" and  the  Infantry  formation  ordered  for  the  attacking 
1~  regiment  conse(luently  did  not  show  the  depth  which 
appears  in  major  operations.     All  three  Infantry  bat- 
talions were  in  the  front  line,  with  reserves  consisting  of 
companies.     The    machine-gun    formation    showed    the 
dual  role  of  the  weapon.     Barrage  groups  were  formed 
from  available  companies  to  act  by  fire,  but  the  charac- 
teristic incorporation  of  machine-gun  companies  in  front- 
line Infantry  battalions  was  again  evident,  and  in  this 
case  the  machine-gun  companies  were  broken  up  into 
detachments   for    front-line    Infantry   companies.     The 
Artillery,  greatly  reinforced,  was  employed  as  a  unit  in 
accordance   with   the   demands   of   such   an   operation. 
Twelve  tanks  accompanied  the  Infantry  to  assist  in  its 
advance.  (40)     In  this  operation,  with  an  advance  limited 
to  one  or  two  thousand  yards,  it  is  evident  that  there 
was  no  occasion  for  the  use  of  accompanying  guns. 
c  ioc Ac          Following  the  Cantigny  operation,   the   1st  Division 
p.34.(4i)         'was  organized  for  defense  against  an  expected  German 
DSonfrjSie14tmaJor  offensive  which  actually  came  between  Noyon  and 
S.  Q$,  ITMontdidier  on  June  9,  1918.  (41)     The  Infantry  formation 
adopted  was  that  of  brigades  abreast,  regiments  abreast, 
with  battalions  in  depth.  (42) 

'  ^uist  ?5  This  Infantry  formation  became  the  basis  of  the  normal 
-' 201~  formation  of  the  division.  In  the  Aisne-Marne  offensive 
of  July  18,  south  of  Soissons,  the  Infantry  had  the  normal 
formation,  brigades  abreast,  regiments  abreast,  battalions 
in  depth,  the  interior  third  line  battalions  in  brigade 
reserve,  the  exterior  third  line  battalions  in  division 
reserve.  The  division  machine-gun  battalion  was  in 
division  reserve;  all  other  machine-gun  companies  were 
attached  to  and  participated  in  action  with  Infantry 
battalions.  The  divisional  Artillery  was  reinforced  by 
a  regiment  of  French  75 's  and  by  other  organizations 


A   STUDY   IN   BATTLE   FORMATION.  11 

of  heavier  artillery.  One  battalion  of  75's  was  assigned 
to  act  with  the  Infantry  in  each  regimental  zone.  This 
was  the  characteristic  assignment  of  subordinate  Light 
Artillery  organizations  to  act  in  direct  liaison  with  sub- 
ordinate Infantry  organizations.  The  necessity  for  hav- 
ing Light  Artillery  guns  up  behind  the  front  line  Infantry 
was  recognized  by  prescribing  that  the  75's  unable  to 
cover  the  advance  to  the  second  objective  would  move 
forward  and  take  position  to  cover  further  advances. 
One  groupement  of  French  tanks,  assigned  to  act  with 
the  Infantry,  consisted  of  48  tanks  and  filled  ther61e 
assigned  to  accompanying  Artillery  in  later  operations. 
The  division  Engineer  regiment  was  broken  up.  One 
company  was  assigned  to  each  Infantry  brigade  for 
engineer  work,  the  other  four  companies  were  held  in 
division  reserve.  (43) 

The  formation  adopted  by  the  1st  Division  for  the 
St.  Mihiel  operation  was  dictated  by  its  mission,  which 
was  to  cover  the  left  flank  of  its  own  advance  and  the 
left  flank  of  the  whole  southern  attack.  The  Infantry 
formation  w^as  normal,  in  so  far  as  it  provided  that  the 
two  Infantry  brigades  and  the  two  Infantry  regiments 
in  each  brigade  attack  abreast.  The  26th,  28th,  and  16th 
Infantry,  from  right  to  left,  were  in  the  formation  normal 
to  the  division;  that  is,  with  battalions  in  depth.  The 
18th  Infantry  on  the  extreme  left  flank  of  the  whole 
southern  attack  naturally  had  to  take  dispositions  to 
cover  the  flank.  In  consequence,  it  had  two  battalions 
in  the  front  line,  the  left  battalion  covering  the  advance 
of  the  right  battalion.  Each  of  these  battalions,  however, 
was  reduced  by  one  company.  One  of  these  detached 
companies  remained  in  regimental  reserve  to  replace  the 
support  battalion  which  would  have  been  at  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  regimental  commander  in  the  normal  forma- 
tion, and  one  company  was  assigned  to  duty  with  tanks 
which  were  to  commence  operations  principally  in  the 
regimental  zone  of  the  18th  Infantry.  The  machine-gun 
strength  of  the  1st  Division  was  reinforced  for  this  opera- 
tion by  the  7th  Machine  Gun  Battalion  of  the  3d  Division. 
The  machine-gun  disposition  for  this  attack  was  one 
machine-gun  company  with  each  Infantry  battalion,  these 
companies  coming  from  the  Infantry  regiments  and 
from  the  brigade  battalions.  The  division  machine-gun 
battalion  remained  in  division  reserve  while  the  7th 
Machine  Gun  Battalion  of  the  3d  Division  was  placed 


12  A  STUDY   IN   BATTLE    FORMATION. 

in  reserve  of  the  1st  Brigade,  which  it  was  believed  would 
have  to  occupy  a  long  defensive  front  on  the  left  flank 
of  the  whole  southern  attack. 

The  divisional  Artillery  was  reinforced  by  the  58th  Field 
Artillery  Brigade,  less  one  battalion  of  155's,  by  one  regi- 
ment of  75 's  from  the  3d  Field  Artillery  Brigade,  and  by 
two  batteries  of  8-inch  howitzers.  The  principal  mission  of 
the  Artillery  was  destruction  fire  and  barrage.  The  75 's 
were  required  to  deliver  barrage  to  protect  the  Infantry  to 
the  second  objective.  Certain  units  of  75's  were  required 
to  move  forward  before  the  Infantry  reached  the  third 
objective  in  order  to  support  any  further  advance.  The 
customary  battalions,  or  larger  units,  were  designated  to 
act  with  subordinate  commands  in  the  various  Infantry 
zones.  Notation  of  the  designation  of  gun  platoons  to 
accompany  the  Infantry  appeared  for  the  first  time  in 
the  orders  of  this  division  in  the  first  purely  American 
great  attack  in  which  it  participated.  Forty-nine 
American-manned  tanks  were  assigned  to  the  support  of 
the  division.  They  were  accompanied  by  detachments 
of  Engineers  and  Infantry  detachments  from  the  18th 
Infantry.  Their  mission,  in  brief,  was  to  assist  the 
advance  of  the  Infantry,  and  consequently  they  had 
much  the  .same  mission  as  did  the  accompanying  Artil- 
lery platoons.  The  division  Engineer  regiment,  rein- 
forced by  two  companies  of  the  51st  Pioneer  Infantry, 
was  used  on  purely  engineering  work  which  required  its 
breaking  up  into  many  details  for  the  purpose  of  cutting 
wire,  assisting  the  advance  of  tanks,  constructing  bridges, 
repairing  roads,  etc.  (44) 

vMo?,'4oJt  ^2,  *n  its  entry  into  the  Meuse-Argonne  operation  the  1st 
i3!(45)H' B''  m~  Division  used  its  normal  Infantry  formation,  brigades 
abreast,  regiments  abreast,  with  their  three  battalions 
in  depth.  The  regiments  from  right  to  left  were  the 
26th,  28th,  18th,  and  16th  Infantry.  Two  companies, 
one  from  each  of  the  first  and  second  line  battalions  of  the 
16th  Infantry,  were  detached  for  combat  patrol  duty  in 
the  Aire  Valley  where  it  was  believed  that  liaison  with 
the  28th  Division  on  the  left  would  be  difficult.  The 
characteristic  attachment  of  machine-gun  companies  to 
first  and  second  line  Infantry  battalions  was  evident.  It 
was  prescribed,  however,  that  these  companies  should 
advance  by  bounds,  thereby  indicating  that  they  might 
have  had  some  trouble  heretofore  in  rigidly  conforming 
to  the  Infantry  advance.  The  machine-gun  companies 


A   STUDY   IN   BATTLE    FORMATION.  13 

normally  attached  to  third-line  battalions  were  all  placed 
in  brigade  reserve  of  their  respective  brigades.  This  in- 
cluded the  companies  normally  attached  to  Infantry 
battalions  in  division  reserve.  The  employment  ordered 
for  the  machine-gun  companies  in  brigade  reserve  was  to 
fill  gaps  and  protect  the  flanks  of  the  advance.  The 
division  machine-gun  battalion  was  held  in  division  re- 
serve. The  principal  mission  of  the  Artillery  for  this  ad- 
vance was  to  furnish  barrage.  The  customary  forward 
movement  by  echelon  was  ordered  and  the  accompanying 
guns  again  appeared  in  the  assignment  of  two  75 's  to  each 
first-line  Infantry  battalion.  Thirty  tanks  of  the  1st 
Brigade  Tanks  were  assigned  to  support  the  advance  of 
the  division.  The  mission  of  the  tanks,  in  general,  was  to 
assist  the  advance  of  the  Infantry  by  attacking  strong 
points.  The  division  Engineer  regiment  was  held  in  divi- 
sion reserve.  (4  5) 

During  the  progress  of  the  attack  of  the  1st  Division  c  R^p°p  °^c-*£ 
from  October  4  the  most  powerful  opposition  was  encoun- ^ NOV. 20/1918, 
tered  and  some  of  the  hardest  fighting  of  the  campaign 
was  necessary.  (4 6)  Consequently  it  was  necessary  to  use  F  0  48  lstl>i. 
divisional  reserves  to  carry  on  the  fight.  (47)  Nightly  Jj^'n  (BCt'20?: 
reorganization  of  battalion  units  and  the  employment, " 
when  necessary,  of  Infantry  battalions  which  had  origi- 
nally been  in  brigade  and  division  reserve  characterized  f|' 
this  advance.  (48) 

By  October  8,  1918,  the  1st  Division  had  been 
forced  by  the  181st  Infantry  Brigade  of  the  91st  Divi-^1! 
sion(49)  which  had  recently  been  withdrawn  from 
line.  (50)     It  was  necessary  to  use  this  brigade  as  well 
all  combat  elements  in  the  division,  including  the  division  A- E-  F-(50) 
Engineer  regiment  and  the  division  machine-gun  battalion, 
in  order  to  continue  the  advance.     The  normal  Infantry 
formation  was  held  to  only  in  that  the  three  Infantry 
brigades  attacked  abreast.     The  181st  Brigade  had  the 
361st  Infantry  in  line.     It  had,  however,  only  a  holding 
mission  and  was  required  to  advance  only  to  conform  to 
the  advance  on  the  rest  of  the  front  of  th,-e  division. 
The  2d  Infantry  Brigade  was  in  the  center.     On  the 
right  of  this  brigade  was  one  battalion  of  Engineers  and 
one  company  of  the  divisional  machine-gun  battalion. 
In  its  center  were  two  battalions  of  the  26th  Infantry 
organized  in  depth.     On  its  left  was  the  28th  Infantry 
organized  in  depth.     The  1st  Infantry  Brigade  was  on 
the  left  of   the  division.     It  had  one   battalion  of  the 


14  A  STUDY  IN   BATTLE   FORMATION. 

16th  Infantry,  which  up  to  this  time  had  been  in  divi- 
sion reserve,  on  the  right  of  the  brigade  front.  This 
fresh  battalion  delivered  the  main  assault.  Next  to 
it  was  the  18th  Infantry  organized  in  depth,  and,  on 
the  left,  the  16th  Infantry  with  its  two  remaining  bat- 
talions organized  in  depth.  One  battalion  of  the  26th 
Infantry,  one  battalion  of  the  1st  Engineers,  one  com- 
pany of  the  division  machine-gun  battalion  and  the  362d 
Infantr}*  were  in  division  reserve.  The  customary  as- 
signment of  machine-gun  companies  to  Infantry  bat- 
talions appeared.  The  division  machine-gun  battalions 
and  the  companies  with  the  third-line  Infantry  battalions 
of  the  2d  Brigade  were  organized  in  four  groups  for  bar- 
rage work.  (49) 

irtiSvisto'oct'     ^n  interesting  feature  of  the  participation  of  the  181st 
aentar'  instruct  In^an^ry  Brigade  in  the  attack  of  the  1st  Division  ap- 
BTiSgfardclstGn-3l:>eare(^  *n  ^e  detailed  disposition  ordered  in  that  brigade 
files,  A. E.  F.(5i)  by  the  ist  Division,  in  order  to  have  it  conform  in  part 
to  the  normal  formations  of  the  1st  Division.     The  361st 
Infantry  and  the  347th  Machine  Gun  Battalion  were  the 
troops  of  the  181st  Brigade  in  line.     They  were  organized 
in  depth.     Two  Infantry  battalions  were  in  the  first  line 
and  one  in  regimental  reserve  for  counter  attack.     The 
battalions  in  line  each  had  two  companies  in  the  front 
line  and  two  companies  100  to  300  meters  in  rear.     The 
machine  guns  were  echeloned  in  checkerboard  formation. 
A  platoon  of  Infantry  and  a  section  of  machine  guns  wore 
combined  into  a  combat  liaison  group  on  each  flank.  (51) 
P.O. 50, 1st DI-     During  the  participation  of  the  181st  Infantry  Brigade 
^V  BC,2oi- in  the  attack  of  the  1st  Division,  an  individual  Artillery 
regiment,  the  124th,  was  definitely  assigned  to  its  sup- 
port, just  as  within  the  1st  Division  the  7th  Field  Artillery 
was  assigned  to  the  2d  Infantry  Brigade  and  the  6th 
Field  Artillery  to  the  1st  Infantry  Brigade.  (52) 
F.o.ei,istDi-     The  next  appearance  of  the  1st  Division  in  attack  was 
Si80n'H.  B.T'2oi-  on  November  6, 19 18.  (53)     The  First  Army  attack  of  No- 
vember 1,  1918,  had  been  increasingly  successful (54)  and 
^Fmai  reporter  the  1st  Division  went  into  line  on  the  left  of  the  2d  Divi- 
pi  51. (so  '       "'  sion  to  exploit  the  success  of  the  5th  Corps  to  which  it  then 
belonged.     The  Infantry  formation  in  the  operation  of 
this  day  was  as  follows:  The  two  Infantry  brigades  were 
abreast,  the  2cl  Brigade  on  the  right,  the  1st  Brigade  on 
the  left.     The  1st  Brigade  was  in  normal  formation  ex- 
cept that  the  interior,  in  place  of  the  exterior  third  line 
battalion,  was  in  division  reserve.     The  2d  Brigade  had 


A  STUDY  IN   BATTLE   FORMATION.  15 

one  regiment  in  line  with  two  battalions  in  the  front  line 
and  one  in  the  second  line.  The  other  regiment  was  in  re- 
serve. The  Artillery  was  directed  to  furnish  accompany- 
ing guns,  this  matter  to  be  arranged  directly  between  the 
Artillery  brigade  and  Infantry  battalion  commanders.  (53) 

Following  the  success  of  the  operation  of  November  6,  .F.o.62,istDi- 
1918,  the  1st  Division  moved  on  Sedan  that  night.  The  5?8°%5°Vfiies,' 
advance  was  made  in  five  columns,  to  take  advantage  of  A< 
all  available  roads.  A  tendency  to  follow  the  normal 
attack  formation  was,  however,  evident.  The  right-hand 
column,  which  moved  directly  down  the  Meuse,  consisted 
of  one  battalion  of  the  16th  Infantry,  and  had  more  or 
less  the  mission  of  a  flank  guard.  The  second  column 
was  composed  of  the  16th  Infantry  less  one  battalion, 
and  one  company  of  Engineers.  The  third  column  was 
composed  of  the  18th  Infantry  less  one  battalion  in  divi- 
sion reserve.  The  fourth  column  was  composed  of  the  28th 
Infantry  and  one  company  of  Engineers.  The  fifth  col- 
umn was  composed  of  the  26th  Infantry.  The  division 
reserves  which  conformed  to  the  movement  of  the  divi- 
sion commander  in  following  up  the  advance  were  one  bat- 
talion of  the  18th  Infantry,  the  1st  Machine  Gun  Bat- 
talion, and  the  1st  Engineers  less  two  companies.  (55) 

Following  the  night  march  on  Sedan,  on  November  7,  Vi^on'6 
the  division  attacked  the  heights  southwest  of  Sedan.    The  \91|  '<* 

A*  J£«  f  .  ( 

usual  attack  formation  was  prescribed.  (56) 
5.  Formations  in  the  2d  Division. 

The  2d  Division,  like  the  1st  Division,  first  entered 
line  under  French  command.     Occupation  and  daily 
servation  of  the  French  defensive  trench  system  in  its  J 
sector  near  Verdun  unconsciously  taught  the  command 
the  value  of  organization  in  depth.  (57) 

Following  the  early  German  offensives  of  1918,  the  2d    Final  report  of 
Division  was  withdrawn  from  the  defensive  sector  near  P- -33.(5$ 
Verdun  and  placed  in  reserve  in  the  vicinity  of  Gisors 
northwest  of  Paris.     It  was  there  when  the  German  offen- 
sive of  May  27  developed  an  unexpected  success,  and  had 
to  be  hurriedly  moved  to  check  the  German  advance.  (58) 
The  disposition  it  assumed  on  its  second  entry  into  the 
line  was  dictated  by  necessity. 

On  June  2,  1918,  the  23d  Infantry,  one  battalion  of  the 
5th  Marines,  the  5th  Machine  Gun  Battalion,  and  one 
company  of  the  2d  Engineers  filled  a  gap  in  the  French 
line  northwest  of  Chateau-Thierry.  For  the  rest  of  June, 
the  division  was  engaged  in  bitter  fighting  in  the  vicinity  A-  E' F>(59) 


I 
16  A  STUDY  IN  BATTLE   FORMATION. 

of  Belleau  Wood,  whose  capture  was  not  completed  until 
June  25.  On  June  23,  an  Infantry  battalion  commander 
stated:  "Infantry  alone  can  not  dislodge  guns."  This 
view  was  accepted  by  the  command,  and  two  days  later 
the  Infantry  lines  were  withdrawn,  and  an  artillery 
concentration  was  placed  on  the  northern  part  of  the 
wood,  which  was  then  taken.  (59) 

c  RA!OE  °F.?'C£     On  July  !>  a  formal  prepared  attack  by  this  division 
i9f8,P.1iS7(60)20'caPtlired  tiie  village  of  Vaux.(60)     The  3d  Brigade  was 
Dh;isio(n',june32olcnarSe(i  w^n  this  attack,  which  was  made  by  one  battal- 
^1  ^f}flles'A-ion  each  of  the  9th  and  23d  Infantry  accompanied  by 
Engineer  detachments.     One  battalion  of  the  9th  In- 
fantry was  in  reserve  to  be  used  in  case  of  necessity.  (61) 
15>jS»e     Tne  disposition  of  the  2d  Battalion  of  the  9th  Infantry, 
which  was  one  of  the  assaulting  battalions,  was  two  com- 
panies in  the  front  line,  one  in  reserve.     A  machine-gun 
company  and  one   company  of   Engineers   for   demoli- 
tion,    together    with    various     1-pounder    and    trench 
mortar  detachments,  were  attached  to  the  battalion  for 
the  operation.     It  sent  out  liaison  detachments  of  one 
platoon  and  one  machine  gun  from  the  supporting  com- 
pany to  one  flank,  and  one-half  of  a  platoon  and  one 
OIS?ion?£frtthe  machine  gun  to  the  other  flank.  (62)     Each  of  the  assault- 
the  9t1f infantry  m&  companies  of  this  battalion  had  two  platoons  in  the 
vnaiSeGSI2esffirst  line  ancl  two  in  support.(63)     The  disposition  of 
AFE6F43623din-tne  assaulting  battalion  of', the  23d  Infantry  was  three 
iSfs^fc-SSesA*  companies,  less  two  platoons,  in  line;  one  company  and 
E.p'.(64).          {.wo  platoons  in  reserve. (64) 

inFcnalAeE>rVC'     ^l16  ^TS^>  participation  of  the  2d  Division  in  a  major 
P.  35  fa)"      *'  offensive  was  in  that  of  July  18, 1918.(65)     The  Infantry 
formation  for  this  attack  was  brigades  abreast,  the  3d 
Brigade  with  regiments  abreast,  the  4th  Brigade  with 
vision,'  \5u?y  ?£tne  5tn  Marines  in  the  front  line  and  the    6th  Marines 
A1!  FG(66)files'm  reserve.  (66)     Initial  formations  were  naturally  broken 
up  in  the  desperate  fighting,  but  some  disposition  in 
2dRBat°tai?o^;  Sh  fl °P th  was  held  to  throughout .     A  b  at t alion  com  n  i  a  1 1  <  1  e  r 
reported  finduig  his  battalion  with  the  left  flank  entirely 
11  tne  &^j  ^ut  w^n  tne  tnree  companies  of  the  battalion 
present  disposed  in  two  lines. (67)     A  note  sent  to  the  2d 
Division  on  July  16,  1918,  by  the  French  20th  Corps, 
under  which  it  attacked  on  July  IS,  prescribed  the  use 
°^  t*mks.     This  note  prescribed  a  depth  organization  for 
'tanks  in  the  contemplated  operation,  this  formation  to 
be  secured  by  assigning  tanks  to  the  direct  support  of 
successive  Infantry  units.  (68) 


A  STUDY  IN   BATTLE   FORMATION.  17 

The  first  participation  of  the  2d  Division  in  a 
offensive    under    American    command    was    in    the    St.42^  >27 


Mihiel  operation.  (69)  The  Infantry  formation  for 
attack  was  brigades  in  depth,  regiments  abreast  in  each  ^ 
brigade,  with  battalions  in  depth  within  the  regiments  - 
The  first-line  Infantry  brigade,  which  was  the  3d  Brigade, 
disposed  of  its  own  machine-gun  battalion  for  the  ad- 
vance. The  regimental  machine-gun  companies  re- 
mained with  the  regiments.  The  machine-gun  battalion 
of  the  4th  Brigade  and  the  division  machine-gun  battal- 
ion were  grouped  under  the  division  machine-gun  officer 
for  barrage  fire,  until  the  4th  Brigade  should  pass  the 
jump-off  line  in  following  up  the  attack.  Both  battalions 
then  passed  to  the  command  of  the  4th  Brigade.  One 
.battalion  of  Artillery  was  assigned  to  assist  the  advance 
of  the  first-line  Infantry  battalions  as  forward  guns. 
The  tanks  attached  to  the  division  for  the  operation  were 
used  to  assist  the  advance  of  the  Infantry  and  reduce 
strong  points.  The  engineer  regiment  was  used  purely 
for  engineer  work  in  this  attack.  (70) 

The  Blanc  Mont  operation  of  the  2d  Division  in  early  ^0°,'  3oct! 
October  showed  another  variation  in  Infantry  formation. 
The  initial  attack  was  a  converging  attack  by  brigades 
both  of  which  were  in  the  front  line  with  an  interval 
between  them;  each  brigade  had  its  regiments  in 
depth,  and  each  front-line  regiment  had  its  battalions  in 
depth.  The  machine-gun  disposition  showed  the  division 
machine-gun  battalion  in  division  reserve.  The  orders 
for  the  Artillery  in  this  operation  required  that  it  be 
brought  forward  in  echelon.  It  is  interesting  to  note 
that  this  division  was  at  this  time  serving  under  French 
command  and  that  accompanying  guns  were  not  re- 
quired in  the  division  order.  A  battalion  of  French  tanks 
was  assigned  to  each  brigade.  (71)  They  are  reported  by 
the  commanding  general,  3d  Brigade,  to  have  been  useful. 
(72)  The  front-line  Infantry  formation  generally  used 
throughout  the  4th  Brigade  in  this  attack  consisted  of 
light  line  of  scouts  followed  by  mobile  combat  groups.  (73) 

The  Infantry  formation  of  the  2d  Division,  for  its 
initial  attack  on  November  1  in  the  Meuse-Argonne 
operation,  was  with  brigades  abreast.  The  3d  Brigade 
had  its  regiments  in  depth,  with  the  23d  Infantry  com- 
mitted to  a  separate  operation  against  a  strong  position 
and  the  9th  Infantry  in  reserve.  The  formation  of  the 

178842°—  20  -  3 


18  A  STUDY  IN  BATTLE   FORMATION. 

lon'4o'ctd:3i"4th  Brigade  was  regiments  abreast,  each  regiment  with 
ion'its  battalions  in  depth.  (74)  In  the  5th  Marines  the 
No1vnjnov'i9it8°:^rst"^me  battalion  had  two  companies  in  the  front  line 
A0tE  FG(74)  mes'  anc^  two  m  support.  Each  of  the  front-line  companies 
had  two  platoons  in  the  first  wave,  and  two  platoons 
following  in  combat  groups.  There  was  a  distance  of 
800  yards  between  the  first  and  second  line  battalions. 
The  formation  ordered  for  the  second-line  battalion  was 
men't6Marinegs"w^n  lmes  °f  combat  groups  in  single  file.  The  third-line 
o-3fiies,A.E.  F.  battalion  followed  at  800  yards  in  the  same  formation.  (7  5) 

disposition  of    the    Gth   Marines    was  with 


machine-gun  disposition  required  a  delivery  of  barrage 
fire,  after  which  regimental  and  brigade  machine-gun 
companies  were  required  to  join  Infantry  organizations, 
for  the  advance.  The  division  machine-gun  battalion 
participated  in  the  harassing  and  barrage  fire  and  event- 
ually passed  into  division  reserve.  Orders  for  the  Artil- 
lery required  its  advance  by  echelon,  as  the  attack  pro- 
gressed. Orders  for  a  detachment  of  the  1st  Brigade 
Tanks  required  their  use  to  reduce  strong  points.  (74) 

Following  the  success  of  the  attack  of  November  1, 
the  2d  Division  adopted  an  extraordinary  night  attack 
formation  with  the  greatest  success.     On  the  night  of 
November  2-3,  and  on  the  night  of  November  3-4,  the 
3d  Brigade  advanced  along  a  road  through  the  enemy 
position  in  column  of  twos,  making  successful  use  of  an 
advance-guard  formation.     An   advance  was  made  on 
Report  of  Oper-tne  nignt  °f  November  3-4,  of  6  kilometers  through  the 
the°nMeuseWand  main  enemy  position.    In  this  advance  one  battalion 
BrigadTSov  u  °f  the  9th.  Infantry,  accompanied  by  a  battery  of  Light 
A91I.R(77)^es'Artmery,  was  in  the  lead.  (77)     The  2d  Field  Artillery 
'.~  Brigade  was  required  to  place  guns  at  the  disposition  of 
F°(78)flles'^e  front-line  Infantry  commanders  following  the  suc- 
cess of  this  night's  advance.  (78) 

The  initial  success  of  the  2d  Division  in  the  Meuse- 
operation  was  attributed  to  complete  coordi- 
<79)  nation  of  the  two  principal  arms,  the  Infantry  and  the 

Artillery.     Its   later   success   was   due    to    daring    and 
advances.  (79)     The    best    use    of    machine-gun 
BaattaIiionefo?aScomPailies  attached  to  Infantry  battalions  was  made 
to°  Nov^i^ms1  wnen  tne  company  was  employed  directly  under  the 
<rjj3ffles,A'.E.F.  company  commander  to  assist  the  advance  of  the  In- 
fantry. (80)     The   best   result   in    the   use   of   Artillery 


A  STUDY  IN   BATTLE  FORMATION.  19 


throughout  the   advance  was    secured    by  placing    re- 
sponsibility  for  the  support  of  the  Infantry  in  the  hands  {^NoVa 
of  the  Artillery  regimental  and  battalion  command  erSpdrig^A^ugy 
in  direct  liaison  with  Infantry  commanders.  (81  )  »•«.<«) 

Fifteen  tanks  jumped  off  on  November  1  with  the  2d    Report  of  oper. 

,J      ~r         .  .         .          .  .    .  ations  of  the  First 

Division.     At  the  first  objective  four  continued  in  sup-Prov.  Tank  Co., 
port  of  the  5th  Marines  and  were  useful  in  the  reductionTanks.forNov.i. 

%  ,.  .  .        .  ,  -  H.B.,  202-53.  (82) 

of  machine-gun  nests,  so  lar  playing  the  role  01  accom- 
panying guns.  (82) 

Various  reports  of  the  2d  Division  rendered  subse- 
quent to  the  armistice  have  a  value  either  as  revealing 
formations  taken  in  particular  cases  or  as  setting  forth 
opinions  as  to  customary  formations  held  by  subordi- 
nate officers  with  combat  experience.  One  interesting  m£SfingGeSS"f 
report  gives  the  varying  formation  adopted  by  a  liaison  |d  JzoSaMss)  H' 
group  which  acted  between  the  2d  Division  and  the  80th 
Division  in  the  attack  of  November  1.  This  group  was 
composed  of  one  company  from  each  of  the  divisions. 
Each  company  was  reinforced  by  a  machine-gun  platoon. 
The  formation  adopted  was  one  of  echelon  in  depth,  one 
company  about  350  yards  behind  the  other.  In  advanc- 
ing between  the  main  zones  of  attack  of  the  two  divi- 
sions it  connected,  this  group  had  occasion  to  utilize 
the  rear  company  for  flanking  action  to  turn  resistance 
on  the  front  of  the  leading  company.  The  distance 
between  the  two  companies  varied  according  to  the 
varying  rate  of  progress  of  the  two  divisions,  and  at 
tunes  it  was  necessary  for  the  rear  company  to  keep 
at  a  distance  of  1  %  kilometers  to  the  rear  of  the  leading 
company.  (83) 

Another  report  of  value  was  rendered  some  time  after 
the  armistice  by  the  commanding  officer,  9th  Infantry, 
which  set  forth  the  opinions  of  various  Infantry  com-  f  J 
pany    officers    of    this    regiment,    a    part    of    the    2dfiles(84) 
Division.  (84)     While  such  opinions  have  not  the  com- 
prehensive  value    of    opinions    formulated    in    division    Etudes  sur  ie 
attack   orders,   they   are   of  interest   as   exhibiting   the  (85?  l 
mental  attitude  of  commanding  officers  of  company  and 
smaller  units,  which  are  the  essential  elements  of  all  bat- 
tle combination.  (85)     The  questions  treated  of  in  this 
report,  which  are  of  especial  interest  in  the  present  study  ; 
were:  that  of  the  proper  formation  of  small  Infantry 
units  for  attacking  machine-gun  nests;  that  of  a  proper 
formation  for  advancing  through  Artillery  fire  ;  and  that  of 
the  value  of  the  accompanying  guns.      Conflict  of  opinion 


20  A  STUDY  IN  BATTLE   FORMATION. 

was  found  even  among  officers  of  the  same  class  in  the 
same  regiment.  There  was,  however,  general  agreement 
that  speed  and  open  formation  was  necessary  in  attack- 
ing machine-gun  nests.  Flanking  action  was  generally 
recommended,  if  possible.  The  value  of  fire  action, 
either  of  Artillery,  auxiliary  Infantry  arms,  or  machine 
guns,  was  recognized.  But  the  tendency  not  to  be 
delayed  by  the  absence  of  such  fire  action  was  illuminat- 
ing. The  formation  for  advancing  through  Artillery 
fire,  which  was  almost  universally  recommended,  was 
that  of  small  open  columns  not  greater  than  a  platoon. 
One  officer  advocated  the  open  skirmish  line,  but  most 
of  the  officers  recognized  the  difficulty  of  control  of  such 
a  line.  Difference  of  opinion  existed  again  as  to  the 
value  of  the  accompanying  gun.  One  officer  made  a 
definite  recommendation  that  one  or  two  guns  be  put 
under  the  immediate  command  of  the  Infantry  battalion 
commander.  This  opinion,  however,  was  not  sustained 
by  all  of  the  other  officers,  one  of  whom  noted  invariably 
successful  support  of  Infantry  advance  by  Artillery  fire 
when  liaison  could  be  maintained  with  Artillery  in  the 
rear.  (84) 

6.  Formations  in  the  26th  Division. 

^MemoJorA.^c.     The  first  appearance  of  the  26th  Division  in  line  waa 
24  wis^  Journal  in  defensive  sectors    under   French  command,  and  its 

of   Operations. 

26th  -Piv.   G-3  formation  showed  the  characteristics  adopted  to  fit  into 

Dies,  A.  t,.  r  .(oo)  /•       1  s~\ 

the  existing  French  organization  of  the  terrain.  On 
April  20,  1918,  the  26th  Division  was  occupying  the 
Ansauville  sector  north  of  Toul.  The  general  occupa- 
tion of  this  sector  by  the  1st  Division  has  already  been 
shown.  On  the  date  in  question  the  26th  Division  had 
the  102d  Infantry  in  line  as  the  right  regiment.  Of  two 
battalions  in  the  front  line,  the  right  battalion  held  the 
front-line  trenches  with  two  companies,  one  less  one 
platoon,  the  other  less  two  platoons.  The  three  de- 
tached platoons  were  in  support  to  the  rear — one  of 
them  as  much  as  2,000  meters  to  the  rear.  The  left 
battalion  had  two  companies  in  the  front  line,  each  less 
one  platoon;  these  two  platoons  were  on  the  main 
position  some  2,000  meters  to  the  rear.  (86)  The  de- 
tailed formation  of  the  advance  companies  noted  is 
principally  interesting  as  indicating  a  characteristic 
tendency  to  break  up  small  organizations  in  order  to 
take  the  fullest  advantage  of  the  shelter  existing  in 
defensive  sectors. 


A  STUDY   IN   BATTLE   FORMATION".  21 

For  the  Aisne-Marne  offensive  from  July  18,  1918,  the  ^..^5^  26th 
26th  Division  was  a  part  of  the  1st  Corps  operating  in  191| 
the  general  vicinity  of  Chateau-Thierry.  (87) 

The  Infantry  formation  ordered  for  the  advance  on  July  Di^-S2o  ^H6* 
19,  1918,  was  Infantry  brigades  abreast.     The  divisional  F^  files! 
orders   required    advance  by  regimental   columns   with 
small  advance  guards  if  the  defensive  action  of  the  enemy 
permitted   this  formation.     The   division   machine  gun 
battalion  was  attached  to  the  52d  Brigade  and  the  attach- 
ment of  subordinate  machine-gun  units  to  subordinate 
Infantryunitswas  evidenced  in  the  composition  of  the  liai- 
son group  formed  to  maintain  connection  with  the  French 
division  on  the  right.     One  regiment  of  75  's  was  assigned 
to  support  each  Infantry  brigade,  the  155's  remaining 
under  the  control  of  the  Artillery  brigade.  (88)     There  atj^$°K£ 
was  no  actual  advance  made  by  this  division  on  July  508ra™e9n1C8ng2J6ut1J 
19,   1918.  (89)     The  use  of  accompanying  batteries 
the  close  support  of  the  front-line  Infantry  and  to  reduce 
machine-gun  nests  first  appeared  in  this  division  in  this 
offensive.     It  was  noted,  however,  that  the  best  use 
such  batteries  was  at  2,000  yards,  at  least,  in  rear  of  the 
front  line  with  very  forward  observers.  (90) 

For  the  St.  Mihiel  operation,  September  12,  1918,  the 
initial  Infantry  formation  in  the  26th  Division  was  brig- 
ades  abreast.  The  51st  Brigade  had  one  regiment  in 
line  with  two  battalions  in  the  first  line  and  one  in  the 
second.  The  second  regiment  was  in  division  reserve. 
The  52d  Brigade  had  its  regiments  abreast,  each  regi- 
ment with  battalions  in  depth.  To  each  front-line  bat- 
talion there  was  attached  one  machine-gun  company,  one 
75  accompanying  gun  and  various  auxiliary  Infantry  observations 
weapons.  Each  second-line  battalion  had  one  machine-  °"dl°crJionUo?  the 
gun  company.  (91)  The  first-line  battalion  had  two  g 


companies  in  the  firing  line  and  two  in  support.     Each  ^Sf  fe?St?  a£ 
company  had  a  similar  organization  in  depth.  (92)  i91|.FG(92)iiles' 

On  October  23,  1918,  the  26th  Division  attacked  on  D^Sn^oct2^ 
the  eastern  heights  of  the  Meuse  north  of  Verdun.     The  i91^  F^}  files> 
51st  Brigade  was  used  for  the  attack  and  the  brigade  in 
turn  used  the  101st  Infantry  for  the  attack  with  the 
102d  Infantry  in  reserve.     The  formation  of  the  101st 
Infantry  was  with  two  front-line  battalions  in  converg- 
ing attack.     Each  battalion  had  two  companies  in  the 
firing  line  and  two  in  support.     The  third  battalion  in 
brigade  reserve  followed  a  front-line  battalion  at  500 


22  A  STUDY  IN   BATTLE   FORMATION. 

meters  distance.  Each  of  the  front-line  battalions  had 
a  machine-gun  company  and  auxiliary  Infantry  weapon 
attached.  The  101st  and  102d  Machine  Gun  Battalions 
were  placed  under  command  of  the  commanding  general 
51st  Brigade  for  the  attack;  which  was  supported  by  the 
fire  of  the  51st  Field  ArtiUery  Brigade. (93) 

Dh-'isionl^bv6?!  It  may  be  noted  that  on  November  7  there  appeared 
i9!!.  FT(94?les'in  the  field  orders  of  this  division  a  new  statement  of  the 
Infantry  formations  to  be  adopted  in  the  event  of  the 
enemy  withdrawal.  It  conformed  to  the  general  prin- 
ciples of  formation  in  depth  already  evidenced  in  the 
orders  of  the  division  but  it  showed  a  striking  similarity 
to  the  normal  formation  of  the  1st  Division.  This  ap- 
pearance followed  the  taking  over  of  command  of  the 
26th  Division  by  a  general  officer  who  had  lately  served 
with  and  for  a  time  commanded  the  1st  Division.  This 
formation  was  brigades  abreast,  regiments  abreast,  each 
regiment  with  battalions  in  depth,  600  meters  between 
first  and  second  line  battalions,  1,000  meters  between 
second  and  third  line  battalions.  The  first-line  battalion 
had  one  machine-gun  company,  a  75-millimeter  accom- 
panying gun,  and  auxiliary  Infantry  weapons  attached. 
The  second-line  battalion  had  a  machine-gun  company 
attached.  Orders  for  the  Artillery  required  it  to  change 
position  by  battalion,  but  attached  one  75-millimeter  gun 
to  each  Infantry  assault  battalion.  (94) 

7.  Formations  in  the  42d  Division. 

Report  of  oper-     The  first  appearance  of  the  42d  Division  on  the  front 

ations  in  Cham-  l  A 

pagne,command-Was  under  French  command  and  this  condition  existed 

ing  General,  42d 

Si?si°G-?enies'  tnrough  tne  Marne  defensive  up  to  July  18,  1918.  (95) 
' ration  Re-  ^e  rePor*  °^  the  commanding  general,  42d  Division, 
~covermg  the  division's  participation  in  the  Aisne-Marne 
offensive,  from  July  18,  1918,  formulated  some  general 
principles  as  a  result  of  experience  gained  in  that  opera- 
tion. It  recommended  the  use  of  Infantry  formations  ca- 
pable of  delivering  heavy  fire-action  in  support  of  the  at- 
tack of  machine-gun  nests  and  noted  that  Infantry  ap- 
proach formations  should  be  used  cautiously  in  pursuit. 
A  formation  with  advance-guard  detachments  was  re- 
ported to  progress  much  more  rapidly.  In  the  absence 
of  tanks  it  recommended  the  aggressive  use  of  a  portion 
of  the  divisional  light  artillery  to  assist  the  advance  of 
the  Infantry  by  destroying  machine-gun  nests  by  direct 
fire.  (96) 


A  STUDY   IN   BATTLE   FORMATION.  23 


For  the  St.  Mihicl  operation  the  42d  Division  used  a 
formation  which  it  had  developed  from  previous  experi-  *}$£>  g^ 
ences.  The  Infantry  formation  was  brigades  abreast,  A  E-r-(97) 
regiments  abreast,  each  regiment  with  battalions  in  depth. 
The  interior  third-line  battalions  were  brigade  reserves. 
The  third-line  battalions  of  exterior  regiments  were  di- 
vision reserves  but  were  placed  about  500  yards  directly 
in  rear  of  the  third-line  battalions  of  interior  regiments. 
The  distance  between  first  and  second  and  second  and 
third  line  battalions  was  about  500  yards.  (97)  In  ad- 
dition  to  its  component  units  each  Infantry  brigade  had^l^gf^163' 
one  battery  of  75  7s,  attached  as  accompanying  artillery 
from  the  taking  of  the  first  objective,  a  detachment  of 
tanks,  two  companies  of  engineers,  and  auxiliary  troops. 
One  regiment  of  75  's  was  the  nucleus  of  each  of  two 
groups  of  Artillery  which  supported  Infantry  brigades  in 
their  zones  and  on  capture  of  the  first  day's  objective, 
passed  to  the  control  of  Infantry  brigade  commanders. 
The  use  of  brigade  machine-gun  organizations  was  left  to 
the  Infantry  brigade  with  the  provision  that  they  should 
be  used  in  depth.  The  division  machine-gun  battalion 
was  in  division  reserve.  (98) 

Orders  for  the  first  participation  of  the  42d  Division  vision,'  6ct.  13, 

,,       ,,  a-         -         -       -    ,     j  J.T  i  1918-     G~3  files» 

in   the  Meuse-Argonne  offensive  insisted  on  th.3  actual  A.  E.  r.(99) 
accompaniment  of  front-line  battalions  by  two  accompa- 
nying guns  per  battalion.  (99) 

The  Infantry  formation  of  the  42d  Division  for  the 
attack  of  October  14,  1918,  in  the  Meuse-Argonne 
offensive  was  with  brigades  abreast.  (99)  The  detailed  fantry'  Brigade" 

p  .*  r  ,1         V,o  i     T     f  T^    •          i  •     Oct.  13,  1918.     H. 

formation  of  one,  the  83d  Infantry  Brigade,  was  regi-B.,  242-23.  (ioo) 
ments  abreast,  each  with  battalions  in  depth.  The 
front-line  battalions  had  two  companies  each  in  the 
front  line  and  t\vo  in  support.  Each  front-line  com- 
pany had  half  its  strength  in  two  assault  waves  20  meters 
apart,  the  remainder  in  support.  The  support  battalions 
followed  the  assault  battalions  at  1  kilometer.  The 
regimental  machine-gun  companies  in  this  brigade 
supported  assault  battalions  as  companies.  The  brigade 
machine-gun  battalion  furnished  details  for  liaison 
groups,  etc.,  and  used  fire  action  from  position.  (100) 

Later    orders   for    the    42d    Division   in    the   Meuse-viSm,'4%ct.d?7~ 
Argonne  offensive  contemplated  the  use  of  brigades  ill  JL^E.  p.(ioi)  es' 
depth  with  3  kilometers  between  brigades,   the  front- 
line brigade  with  regiments  abreast  and  supported  by 
the  divisional  artillery  and  machine-gun  battalions.  (101) 


24  A  STUDY   IN   BATTLE    FORMATION. 


appearance  of  the  42d  Division  in  action 
£?!.  F^Io2?lfl8>was  m  the  pursuit  toward  Sedan,  following  the  break 
through  of  November  1,  1918.  Here  the  normal  Infan- 
try formation  of  the  division  reappeared.  It  was 
brigades  abreast,  regiments  abreast,  each  regiment  with 
its  battalions  in  depth.  In  this  case,  hoAvever,  all 
Infantry  was  left  at  the  disposition  of  the  brigade  com- 
manders and  in  addition  the  division  machine-gun 
battalion  and  one  company  of  division  engineers  were 
attached  to  the  84th  Infantry  Brigade.  The  division 
reserve  consisted  of  the  division  engineer  regiment  less 
one  company.  (102) 

Final  report  C.  8.  Formations  in  the  27th  and  30th  Divisions. 
pp.33,54.(io3)  '  Several  divisions  had  their  first  training  with  the 
British,  but  two  only,  the  27th  and  the  30th,  had  all 
their  war  service  under  British  command.  These  divi- 
sions under  the  2d  Corps  participated  in  very  heavy 
fighting,  including  the  breaking  of  the  Hindenburg  line, 
in  September  and  October,  1918.  (103)  It  is  interesting- 
to  note  what  difference,  if  any,  existed  between  the 
formations  adopted  by  these  divisions  and  the  diA'isions 
which  w^ere  more  within  the  sphere  of  French  influence. 

Report  of  O  per-  . 

Di?£io°nf  ^aiS  attack  of  September  29,  1918,  on  the  Hmden- 

the  Hindenburg  burg  lino    the  30th  Division  had   the  60th  Brigade  in 

line,  Sept.  27-30.   . 

B.,  182-  Ime  with  the  120th  Infantry  on  the  right  and  the  119th 
on  the  left.  Both  regiments  had  two  battalions  in  the 
front  line  and  one  in  support.  The  117th  Infantry  of 
the  59th  Brigade  had  the  special  mission  of  following1 
the  120th  Infantry  and  facing  and  acting  south  to  protect 
the  right  flank.  The  regimental  machine-gun  com- 
panies acted  with  the  Infantry  front-line  battalions.  It 
is  noted  that  they  had  difficulty  in  keeping  up  with  the 
battalions,  but  were  useful  against  enemy  machine 
guns.  The  division  machine-gun  battalion  was  assigned 
to  the  117th  Infantry  for  use  in  its  mission  of  protecting 
the  flank.  (104) 

One  company  of  this  battalion,  which  Avas  assigned 
to  the  support  of  a  cleaning-up  company  of  the  117th 
Infantry,  did  good  work.  Both  brigade  machine-gun 
battalions  Avere  on  barrage  work.  They  A\vre  grouped 
under  corps  orders  to  deliver  overhead  covering  fire  and 
later  were  assembled  to  move  on  orders  from  diAnsion 
headquarters.  The  divisions  of  the  2d  Corps  were  sup- 
ported by  Australian  Artillery,  as  their  own  artillery 


A  STUDY   IN   BATTLE   FORMATION.  25 

did  not  serve  with  them.  The  mission  of  the  support- 
ing Artillery  was  barrage.  Following  the  advance,  sup- 
porting batteries  were  moved  forward  with  daring  and 
skill,  while  close  liaison  between  Infantry  and  Artillery 
was  maintained  at  all  times.  Tanks  were  assigned  to  the 
support  of  the  three  Infantry  regiments  actively  en- 
gaged. Those  assigned  to  the  117th  and  120th  Infantry 
were  up  in  time  to  accompany  the  Infantry.  Those  as- 
signed to  the  119th  Infantry  were  not.  All  tanks  were 
troubled  by  the  fog,  but  were  effective  in  destroying  many 
machine-gun  nests.  (104) 

In  a  later  attack,  October  9,  1918,  the  30th  Div ision  .  Battle  instruo- 

tions  No.  1, series 

had  the  59th  Brigade  in  the  front  line  with  one  battalion  ^t30*h  g\xsisi<g; 
from  the  60th  Brigade  as  brigade  reserve  of  the  59thB.,is2-7.(io5) 
Brigade.     The     Infantry    regiments    in     the    first-line 
brigade    were    abreast.     The    117th    Infantry    had    its 
battalions  in  depth  and  the  118th  had  two  battalions 
in  the  front  line.     There  was  the  customary  use  of  tanks, 
one  battalion  of  heavy  tanks  being  assigned  for  action 
with    the   front-line   Infantry,    and    two    companies    of 
whippets    to    assist   in   the   exploitation.     No   use   was 
made  of  accompanying  Artillery.  (105) 

For  the  attack  of  October  17  the  2d  Corps  had  both  ^P^  <§'c ™ 
the  27th  and  30th  Divisions  in  line.  The  27th  Division IJ*™^  B'» 
had  brigades  abreast,  regiments  in  depth,  each  regiment 
wath  battalions  in  depth.  The  regimental  machine-gun 
companies  were  at  the  disposition  of  the  regimental 
commander.  The  brigade  machine-gun,  battalions  were 
used  for  barrage  work,  and  the  division  battalion  was 
in  reserve.  There  was  the  customary  use  of  tanks — ten 
heavy  tanks  from  the  301st  Tank  Battalion  assisting 
the  advance  Infantry,  and  so  far  filling  the  r61e  of  accom- 
panying guns,  of  which  no  mention  was  made.  (106) 

The  30th  Division  had  its  Infantry  brigades  in  depth, 
regiments  abreast,  each  regiment  with  its  battalions  in  t^N^f and 
depth.     The    third-line    battalions    were    available    as  ffc^Son,  o'cSs! 
brigade    reserves.     The    regimental   machine-gun    com-8^118(J7)H<B''182~ 
panics  were  at  the  disposition  of  the  regimental  com- 
manders for  use  with  the  advance  Infantry.     The  114th 
Machine-Gun   Battalion  was   required    to   provide   one 
company  to  follow  the  advance  battalion  of  each  Infantry 
regiment  at  not  more  than  1,200  yards,  with  the  various 
missions  of  protecting  the  flank,  delivering  fire  from  com- 
manding positions,  reducing  machine  gun  nests,  and  re- 
placing the  forward  machine  guns.     The  other  companies 


26  A  STUDY   IN   BATTLE    FORMATION. 

were  to  move  forward  in  support.  The  113th  and  1  loth 
Machine  Gun  Battalions  were  assigned  to  harassing  fire. 
The  mission  of  the  Artillery  was  barrage,  with  provision 
for  the  moving  up  of  the  mobile  Artillery  at  the  leap 
frog  provided  for  Infantry  brigades.  Twelve  tanks  were 
assigned  to  assist  the  Infantry  in  the  attack.  (107) 

It  should  not  be  considered  that  the  27th  and  30th  Divi- 
sions as  a  part  of  the  2d  Corps,  serving  under  British 
tactical  command,  were  far  removed  from  the  influence 
of  the  tactics  developed  in  the  new  American  Armies. 
The  relationship  between  the  development  of  tactics  in 
these  isolated  divisions  and  in  the  divisions  serving  under 
purely  American  command  was  shown  in  the  publica- 
tion for  the  information  and  guidance  of  the  30th  Divi- 
sion of  extracts  from  a  report  of  a  brigade  commander  in 
the  First  American  Army. 

3othnDi  vision6  This  report  recommended  the  assignment  of  battal- 
P™1"  ^°  attack,  to  areas  one-half  kilometer  in 
m  order  to  provide  shelter.  It  recommended  the 
Bt>  moving  up  of  the  second-line  battalion  just  previous  to 
the  jump-off  in  order  to  get  through  the  barrage  quicker, 
and  that  the  third  battalion  hold  its  distance  and  pick  its 
way  between  shelled  areas  in  advancing.  The  Infantry 
formation  recommended  within  the  brigade  was  that  of 
regiments  abreast,  each  regiment  with  battalions  in 
depth  and  one  company  taken  from  each  third-line 
battalion  to  follow  the  brigade  commander  at  200  meters 
as  his  reserve.  .The  formation  recommended  for  the 
first-line  companies  was  two  platoons  in  the  first  wave, 
and  two  platoons  in  support  at  100  meters.  The  use  of 
machine  guns  was  provided  for  by  assigning  one  com- 
pany to  each  battalion  as  the  fifth  company  of  that 
battalion  and  prescribing  the  use  of  overhead  fire  when 
possible.  (108) 

The   Infantry  formations  used   by   divisions  serving 
with  the  British  appeared,  therefore,  to  have  followed 
much  the  same  lines  as  those  used  by  American  divisions 
serving  under  French  tactical  command  and  American 
divisions  serving  under  purely  American  command.     In 
the  use  of  machine  guns  there  was  evidenced  a  tendency 
to  .use  only  regimental  machine  guns  in  intimate  con- 
nection with   the  advancing  Infantry  and   to  use  the 
in  c.^A^K.V,  machine-gun  battalions  rather  more  as  units  for  barrage 
I9i8,ep.3.(io9)    'work.     This  use  followed  closely  that  which  must  have 


A  STUDY  IN   BATTLE   FORMATION".  27 

been  visualized  for  the  machine  gun  when  the  tables  of 

organization    which    governed    American    divisions    in 

France  were  drawn  up.  (109)     A  report  of    a  board  ofoJ^J^gifJ 

machine-gun  officers  from  the  27th  Division,  concurred  SsSmf'ja!?  ?£ 

in  by  the  division  commander,  recommended  the  use  of  ^o)  H'  B>'227* 

machine  guns  as  a  fourth  arm.  (HO) 

9.  Formations  in  Other  Divisions. 

Formations  in  other  divisions,  as  evidenced  by  division 
orders,  conformed  essentially  to  the  formations  found 
in  the  six  divisions  already  instanced.  They  naturally 
varied  somewhat  according  to  conditions. 

In  the  St.  Mihiel  operation  the  90th  Division  held^^;8^1*- 
quite  a  wide  front  and  attacked  initially  only  on  a  part  of  g^y0-' B<>  290~ 
the  front.     The  formation  adopted  was  brigades  abreast^ 
regiments     abreast.     One    machine-gun    company   was 
attached  to  each  assault  battalion.     The  Artillery  was 
charged  with  barrage. (Ill) 

In  participation  in  this  operation  this  division  found  ce^toteQ  S^tiSS 
that  the  most  successful  formation  for  an  Infantry  bat-jjjj^y^  ]jjjj' 
talion  on  a  front  of  five  to  six  hundred  meters  was  a  square  H-  B.29d-i4.(ii2> 
formation,  with  two  companies  in  assault  and  two  in 
support.  More  companies  in  assault  on  a  wider  front 
resulted  in  loss  of  control  and  driving  power.  The  for- 
mation adopted  in  one  of  its  Infantry  regiments  was  as 
above,  with  two  platoons  in  each  company  in  the  assault 
and  two  in  support,  with  150  meters  between  the  assault 
and  support  companies  and  with  each  support  company 
formed  in  one-half  platoon  columns.  In  this  regiment  a 
machine-gun  company  was  attached  to  each  Infantry 
battalion,  with  one  platoon  of  the  machine-gun  company 
on  each  flank  and  to  the  rear  and  with  the  third  platoon 
50  meters  to  the  rear.  A  question  was  raised  as  to  the 
value  of  machine-gun  companies  with  the  assault  bat- 
talions when  Infantry  is  following  the  barrage.  (1 12) 

Toward   the   end   of    .the   Meuse-Argonne   operation,  c  ^gi  ypgrtF°f 
which  had  developed  in  a  manner  into  a  battle  of  attri-  p-p9-$3}3  90th 
tion,(113)    this    division    employed     its     brigades    one  J^gision'  HCt'  B' 
behind  the  other.     The  attacking  brigade  had  its  regi-290~11-(114) 
ments  in  depth.     The  reserve  brigade  had  its  regiments 
abreast    with    battalions    in    depth.     A    machine-gun 
company  was  attached  to  each  assault  battalion.     One 
Artillery  battery  was   designated   as   an   accompanying 
battery  for  the  leading  battalion  of  the  360th  Infantry. 
(114) 


28  A   STUDY  IN   BATTLE    FORMATION. 


A  report  of  the  French  Military  Mission  with  this 
Division  Juiyao1  division  throws  an  interesting  sidelight  on  the  use  of 
K?.  (ii!)'    B-  machine  guns  with  Infantry  in  attack  maneuvers  before 
entering    the   line.     The   report    criticized    the    use   of 
machine-gun  battalions  in  large  batteries,  out  of  liaison 
with  the  Infantry,   and  insisted  that  the  employment 
of  machine-gun  units  with  Infantry  battalions  is  essen- 
tial.    This  is,  of  course,  an  established  French  doctrine 
supported  by   their  organization   of  the  Infantry  bat- 
talion to  include  a  machine-gun  company.  (115) 

The  Meuse-Argonne  operation  was  the  only  major 
offensive  in  which,  the  80th  Division  participated  as  a 

Special  report,  „,  •,     T    „  „  .  ,     ,  ,  . 

soth     Division,  unit.     The   normal    Infantry   formation    used    by    this 

Sept.  9-Nov.  11,  ....  T  i         iir  . 

1918.  H.B.  mes,  division  throughout  the  Meuse-Argonne  operation  was 
F.  6.  16,  soth  column  of  brigades.     On  September  26,  1918,  the  divi- 

Division,  Oct.  22,    .  fe.  f  .  .11 

1918.  H.B.  mes,  sion  attacked  in  its  normal  formation  with  the  160th 
Infantry  Brigade  in  front.  This  brigade  had  its  regi- 
ments abreast,  each  regiment  with  battalions  in  depth. 
The  machine-gun  battalion  of  the  assaulting  brigade 
was  at  the  disposition  of  the  brigade,  with  machine-gun 
companies  attached  to  each  front  line  Infantry  battalion. 
The  other  two  battalions  were  used  to  deliver  overhead 
covering  fire,  which  prisoners  reported  very  effective. 
One  battalion  of  75's  was  assigned  to  the  direct  support 
of  the  160th  Infantry.  Brigade;  one  battery  from  this 
battalion  was  assigned  to  each  front-line  Infantry  bat- 
talion, the  third  battery  was  placed  under  the  direct 
orders  of  the  Infantry  brigade  commander  and  was  to 
be  moved  up  with  the  supporting  Infantry.  The  use 
planned  for  this  Artillery  was  fire  in  support  of  the  In- 
fantry at  from  300  to  1,500  meters.  (11  6-1  17) 

In  the  attack  of  October  4  the  80th  Division  employed 
the  same  Infantry  formation.  Front-line  battalions  used 
two  companies  in  the  front  line  and  two  in  support.  One 
battalion  of  75's  was  assigned  to  the  attacking  Infantry 
brigade  as  accompanying  Artillery.  This  battalion,  how- 
ever, was  actually  incorporated  in  the  ban-age  and  did 
not  move  forward  on  the  first  day.  In  the  attack  of 
November  1  the  80th  Division  was  supported  by  the 
157th  Field  Artillery  Brigade  of  the  82d  Division.  In 
this  attack  one  regiment  of  75's  was  utilized  only  600 
yards  from  the  front  line.  (116) 


A  STUDY  IN  BATTLE  FORMATION.  29 


A  note  published  by  this  division  during  the  latter 
of  the  Meuse-Argonne   operation  prescribed  the  use 
accompanying  guns  in  accordance  with  instructions  from  A:  E-  F-(118> 
higher  authority.  (1  18) 

The  first  experience  of  the  91st  Division  was  in  the  of 
Meuse-Argonne  offensive  on  September  26.  This  divi- 
sion  attacked  with  its  Infantry  brigades  abreast.  The  A.1!.  R(U9)files> 
181st  Brigade  on  the  right  had  its  regiments  abreast  each 
with  one  battalion  in  line  and  one  in  support.  The  182d 
Brigade  had  its  regiments  in  column  each  with  one  bat- 
talion in  the  front  line  and  one  in  support.  On  Septem- 
ber 27  the  182d  Brigade  changed  its  formation  to  place 
its  Infantry  regiments  abreast.  On  September  28  both 
brigades  had  their  regiments  in  depth.  The  third-line 
Infantry  battalions  were  held  in  reserve,  one  battalion 
in  each  brigade  was  the  brigade  reserve,  the  other  third- 
line  battalion  forming  part  of  the  division  reserve. 
There  was  a  characteristic  attachment  of  machine-gun 
companies  to  Infantry  battalions.  One  regiment  of  75's 
was  assigned  to  the  support  of  each  Infantry  brigade. 
Accompanying  guns  taken  from  the  supporting  Artillery 
were  reported  to  have  been  used  successfully  with  assault 
battalions,  as  were  the  Infantry  37's.(119) 

Following  its  participation  in  the  Meuse-Argonne  of-  D^on  oct°3o! 
fensive,  in  the  middle  of  October,  the  91st,  together  with  ^I.^Jof  es'  A 
the  37th  Division,  was  attached  to  the  French  6th  Army 
in  Belgium.  The  91st  Division  was  accompanied  by  the 
Field  Artillery  brigade  of  the  28th  Division.  On  Oc- 
tober 31  this  division  attacked  with  its  Infantry  brigades 
abreast.  The  181st  Brigade  on  the  right  had  its  regi- 
ments in  depth  and  the  first-line  regiment  had  two  bat- 
talions in  the  front  line;  the  182d  Brigade  on  the  left 
had  but  one  regiment  in  line.  This  regiment  had  its 
battalions  in  depth.  A  minimum  depth  of  300  meters 
was  prescribed  for  each  battalion  and  the  minimum  dis- 
tance of  500  meters  between  battalions.  In  each  assault 
battalion  two  companies  were  in  the  front  line,  the  other 
two  companies  in  support  at  300  meters  distance.  The 
characteristic  attachment  of  subordinate  machine-gun 
units  to  subordinate  Infantry  units  appeared  in  the  for- 
mation of  a  cleaning-up  battalion.  After  the  first  ob- 
jective had  been  taken  by  the  Infantry  one  regiment  of 
75's  passed  to  the  command  of  each  Infantry  brigade. 
One  platoon  of  75's  was  assigned  for  use  as  accompany- 
ing guns  to  each  front-line  Infantry  battalion.  (120) 


30  A  STUDY  IN  BATTLE   FORMATION. 


On  September  26,  1918,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Meuse- 
'  fii2?Argonne  offensive  the  Infantry  formation  of  the  35th 
A.E.F.(i2i)  Division  was  brigades  in  depth,  with  the  69th  Brigade  in 
the  front  line.  This  brigade  had  its  regiments  abreast, 
with  the  138th  Infantry  on  the  right,  the  137th  Infantry 
on  the  left.  Both  regiments  had  their  battalions  in 
depth.  One  battalion  was  detached  from  the  70th 
Brigade,  as  the  69th  Brigade's  reserve.  Each  assault 
and  support  battalion  had  a  machine-gun  company 
attached.  Combat  liaison  groups  each  of  one  company 
and  a  machine-gun  platoon  were  sent  out  by  the  69th 
Brigade  to  flanking  divisions.  (121)  The  remainder  of 
Division,  se'pt.  24,  the  machine  guns  were  designated  to  fire  barrage.  One 
A.E.F.(i22)  cs'  platoon  of  Light  Artillery  was  designated  to  support 
tanks  against  antitank  guns,  and  one  battery  used  as 
forward  guns  with  advance  Infantry.  The  Artillery  fired 
barrage  and  moved  forward  by  echelon.  The  344th 
Tank  Battalion  less  one  company  assisted  the  advance 
of  the  Infantry.  (122)  September  27  the  70th  Brigade 
passed  through  to  attack  with  regiments  abreast,  each 
regiment  with  two  battalions  in  the  front  line  and  one  in 
support.  The  69th  Brigade  was  in  support,  with  regi- 
ments abreast  and  battalions  in  depth.  (121) 

On  September  28  on  the  assumption  that  the  main 
of  the  enemy  had  retreated,  and  that  the  advance 
would  be  opposed  principally  by  Artillery  and  machine- 
gun  fire,  a  two-column  formation  was  ordered  for  Septem- 
ber 29.  (123)  Both  Infantry  brigades  were  split  in  this 
new  formation.  These  columns  were  essentially  provi- 
sional brigades  abreast,  the  right  column  consisting  of 
the  138th  and  the  140th  Infantry  and  the  129th  Machine 
Gun  Battalion,  the  left  column  of  the  137th  and  the 
139th  Infantry  and  the  130th  Machine  Gun  Battalion. 
Of  the  leading  regiments,  the  138th  Infantry  had  its 
battalions  in  depth.  The  137th  had  two  assaulting  bat- 
talions, one  in  support.  A  machine-gun  company  was 
attached  to  each  assault  and  support  battalion.  (121) 
As  in  the  case  of  the  35th  Division,  the  first  participa- 


se'pt.  2£ovcits!°i;tion  of  the  79th  Division  in  a  major  offensive  was  be- 
A91E.F.<(T234)flks'tween  the  Meuse  and  the  Argonne  on  September  26. 
The  initial  Infantry  formation  was  elaborate.  Brigades 
were  in  depth  with  the  157th  Brigade  in  the  front  line. 
This  brigade  had  its  regiments  abreast,  the  314th  In- 
fantry on  the  right,  the  313th  on  the  left.  Each  regiment 
had  two  battalions  in  the  front  line  and  one  in  brigade 


A  STUDY  IN   BATTLE   FORMATION.  31 

reserve.  The  front-line  battalions  were  echeloned  in 
depth  by  companies,  with  one  company  in  the  front  line, 
one  in  support,  one  in  battalion  reserve,  and  one  in  regi- 
mental reserve.  One  company  from  each  battalion  in 
brigade  reserve  was  returned  to  be  distributed  through- 
out the  regiment  for  cleaning  up.  Subordinate  machine- 
gun  units  were  attached  to  subordinate  Infantry  units. 
The  147th  Field  Artillery  was  designated  as  accompany- 
ing Artillery  for  both  front-line  regiments  and  ordered 
to  proceed  forward  to  report  to  them  on  conclusion  of  its 
barrage  mission.  (124) 

On  September  27,  however,  both  brigades  of  this 
division  were  split  and  two  provisional  brigades  abreast 
with  regiments  in  depth  were  created  as  in  the  case  of 
the  35th  Division.  To  push  the  advance  the  command- 
ing general  of  the  158th  Brigade  was  placed  in  command 
of  the  Provisional  158th  Brigade  consisting  of  the  315th 
Infantry,  and  the  314th  Infantry  from  the  157th  Brigade. 
The  commanding  general  of  the  157th  Brigade  was 
placed  in  command  of  a  provisional  brigade  consisting  of 
the  313th  Infantry,  in  the  front  line,  and  the  316th  In- 
fantry, from  the  158th  Brigade,  in  support.  (124) 

The  90th  Division  has  been  seen  to  have  changed  from 
a  prior  formation  of  brigades  abreast  to  one  of  brigades  in 
depth  in  its  participation  in  the  Meuse-Argonne  offen- 
sive. The  80th  Division  has  been  seen  to  have  used  the 
latter  throughout  this  battle  of  attrition.  It  is  self- 
evidently  useful  as  prolonging  the  period  of  battle  avail- 
ability of  a  division  by  making  possible  entire  internal 
Infantry  relief.  But  the  parallel  instances  of  the  35th 
and  79th  Divisions,  changing  from  an  established  forma- 
tion of  brigades  in  depth  to  an  improvised  one  of  pro- 
visional brigades  abreast,  even  in  the  midst  of  battle, 
would  seem  to  indicate  the  value  in  times  of  stress  of  the 
simpler  formation  of  brigades  abreast. 
10.  General  Discussion. 

The  instances  quoted  show  the  formations  adopted  by 
various  divisions  under  various  circumstances  in  an 
endeavor  to  utilize  to  the  fullest  the  power  of  the  various 
arms.  This  was  naturally  also  the  preoccupation  of 
General  Headquarters,  A.  E.  F.,  which  published  from 
time  to  time,  during  the  participation  of  American  forces 
in  the  war  with  Germany,  "  Notes  on  Recent  Operations," 
in  order  to  disseminate  among  the  command  knowledge 


32  A  STUDY  IN  BATTLE   FORMATION. 

gained  from  experience.     Following  the  armistice  various 

boards  were  convened  by  General  Headquarters,  A.  E.  F., 

to  study  and  make  available  for  future  utilization  late 

perio?°BoarfdSoUn  experiences.    Finally  a  superior  board  was  appointed  to 

tartte^A^.a5?  study  the  same  questions  in  a  more  general  manner,  to 

A.XE.  F.cra^'pass  on  the  reports  of  the  boards  on  the  various  arms, 

and  to  render  a  final  report  on  organization  and  tactics. 

(125)     From  a  study  of  the  documents  just  mentioned. 

and  especially  from  a  study  of  the  report  of  the  Superior 

Board,  general  conclusions  as  to  what  formations  gave 

the  best  results  may  be  drawn. 

The  organization  of  the  Infantry  division  was  sound  and 

appropriate  to  the  requirements  of  modern  battle  tactics. 

A  three-unit   system   in   divisional    organization  might 

have  been  more  appropriate  for  envelopment,  but  the 

two-unit  system  was  better   for  penetration.  (125)     No 

mane<^rgGene°r?i",  necessity  existed  for  a  three-unit  system  in  divisions  in 

G-3fijSfi?E! K  the  experience  of  the  A.  E.  F.  as  the  division  was  always 

a  part  of  an  army.     The  existing  two-unit  system  was 

better  for  relief,  liaison,  etc.  (126) 

Report  of  supe-  The  Infantry  continued  to  be  the  basic  arm.  Infantry 
PprilSra27e)tc''  attacks  alone  were  found  to  be  decisive.  (127)  In  order 
rtoH^?2£to  defeat  the  enemy  the  Infantry  must  be  prepared  to 
pp.2i-27.<i28)  cloge  with  him  The  unit  ^^h  must  be  charged  with 

this  duty,  the  combat  unit,  was  found  to  be  the  Infantry 

battalion.  (128) 

cen0tteopjrnati?S     The   essential  in   all  Infantry  formation  within   the 
G-s  3±.  B.'  Mis!  division  was  found  to  lie  in  a  disposition  in  depth,  to 

combine  facility  of  command  with  avoidance  of  losses. 

This  dictated  attacks  in  thin  waves  supported  by  small 

columns.  (129) 
Notes  on  Re-     The  proper  formation  to  secure  the  most  effective  use 

cent  Operations  . 

NO.  i.  NO.  1322,  of  machine  guns  was  constantly  in  question.     Ihe  neces- 

G-5,   and   Notes  >•     * 

a?ions3No1Y)$o'~sity  ^or  tne  Pnvsical  advance  of  the  machine  guns  with 
files '(Sot  **'  B'  tne  Infantry  and  the  necessity  for  utilizing  machine  gun 
fire  effect  to  assist  the  advance  of  the  Infantry  were  con- 
stantly in   conflict.  (130)     Even  after  the  armistice  dif- 
rio?eSSr°dffetpctference  of  opinion  existed  as  to  the  proper  formation  to 
pp.i27-i28.'(i3i)'be  adopte(}  by  machine-gun  units.     The  Superior  Board, 
however,  found  that  as  the  Infantry  battalion  was  the 
essential  combat  unit  and  as  a  machine-gun  organization 
must  be  an  essential  part  of  that  unit,  a  machine-gun 
company  should  form  a  part  of  each  Infantry  battalion. 
The  board  also  found  that  the  number  of  machine-gun 
companies  in  the  division,  fourteen,  was  correct,  as  giv- 


A  STUDY  IN  BATTLE  FORMATION.  33 

ing  one  company  for  each  Infantry  battalion  and  the 
division  machine-gun  battalion  as  a  reserve.  (131) 

The  use  of  Infantry  auxiliary  arms  was  constantly  structions  NO! 
made  the  subject  of  comment  in  notes  on  operations  or  mS  .'(?32)' 
combat  instructions.     The  agreement  was  general  that 
the  37  millimeter,  1  -pounder  gun  should  be  used  by  the 
front-line   Infantry   battalions    and    that    the    Infantry 
trench  mortars  should  be  used  so  far  as  the  difficulties  of 
ammunition  supply  permitted.  (132) 

The  mission  of  tanks  was  found  to  be  the  destruction  rio?eSoard,SeK 
of  strong  points  which  impeded  Infantry  advance  and  the  p'  2 
employment  of  tanks  distinctly  advantageous  to  morale. 
It  was  found  that  tank  units   should   be   organized  in 
association  with  and  fight  as  a  part  of  Infantry  com- 
mands.    It  was  believed  that  all  tanks  should  be  armed 
with  75-millimeter  guns.  (133) 

The  principle  of  unity  of  direction  of  Artillery  fire  as  rio?eB0oard,Se£; 
laid  down  in  Field  Artillery  Drill  and  Service  Regula-pp<3& 
tions  was  found  to  be  sound,  and  it  was  found  that  com- 
mand of  Artillery  units  should  normally  remain  in  the 
hands  of  Artillery  officers.  It  appeared  essential,  how- 
ever, that  there  should  be  the  closest  possible  contact 
between  Infantry  and  the  supporting  Artillery  and  that 
consequently  within  the  division  the  subordinate  Artil- 
lery units  should  be  regularly  assigned  to  work  with  sub- 
ordinate Infantry  units,  one  75-millimeter  regiment  to 
each  Infantry  brigade.  (134) 

Some  inefficiency  was  found  as  a  result  of  the  employ-  c?mpm  a  nding 
ment  in  support  of  divisional  Infantry  of  French  Artil- 
lery  or  of  American  Artillery  not  belonging  to  the  (Jivi- 
sion,  with  a  consequent  loss  of  intimate  association  and 
teamwork.  (135) 

This  lack  of  teamwork  between  Infantry  and  Artillery  Araty,°'oct.'  2? 
may  have  prompted   the  use   of   accompanying  guns,  i9*|.  F^f6)files> 
which  has  been  seen  to  have  been  consistently  adhered 
to  in  operations  under  American  command  and  which 
was  directly  ordered  by  such  superior  units  as  an  army. 
(136)     The  use  of  the  accompanying  gun  conformed  to 


German  tactics  in  the  German  offensives  of  1918.     Itjgf- 
may  be  noted  that  the  Germans  notoriously  lacked  tanks,  1918-<137) 
of  which  no  use  was  made  in  these  offensives.  (13  7) 

It  has  been  seen  that  this  device  was  not  used  by  Amer- 
ican divisions  under  French  or  British  command  except 
in  the  case  of  a  division  serving  under  French  control 
in  the  last  days  of  the  war  after  its  habits  had  been 


34  A  STUDY  IN  BATTLE   FORMATION. 

B<SX?\ftme?y  ^  ormed  un^er  American  command.     The  Field  Artillery 
?9i8rd)'a Spies' Board  found  that  the  previous  use  of  accompanying  guns 
A.E.  F.(i38)      haci  been  a  failure  and  recommended  the  use  of  tank 
mounts  for  accompanying  Artillery.  (13 8)     The  Superior 
Board  found  physical  difficulties  in  getting  up  the  accom- 
rio?eCardf,Sctpce;  panying  gun.  (139)    This  recalls  Gen.  Chaff ee's  statement: 
PP-36and4^139>' 'Nothing  whatever  should  be  included  in  the  Infantry 
that  can  not  be  moved  by  hand  over  any  kind  of  ground, 
any  kind  of  weather,  and  at  any  hour  of  the  day  or 
The  Superior   Board   consequently   con- 
use  °^  a  tank  mount  for  the  accompanying 
gun.     This  board,  however,  insisted  on  the  value  of  the 
psychological  effect  of  intimate  association  between  the 
Infantry  and  Artillery  as  exemplified  in  the  support  of 
subordinate  Infantry  commands  by  subordinate  Artillery 
commands.  (139) 
11.  Conclusions. 

It  is  evident  that  formations  must  vary  according  to 
conditions.  Two  distinct  formations  for  an  Infantry 
division  have  been  seen;  they  are  that  of  Infantry 
brigades  abreast  and  that  of  Infantry  brigades  in  depth. 
It  may  be  said  that  the  formation  with  brigades  abreast 
has  the  virtue  of  simplifying  the  problems  of  command 
and  communication,  always  so  difficult  in  battle,  and 
that  it  possesses  greater  power  for  an  initial  blow  than 
does  the  other  formation. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  formation  with  brigades  in 
depth  lends  itself  better  to  a  continuing  battle  by  mak- 
ing possible,  within  a  division,  complete  Infantry  relief, 
and  that  it  presents  greater  opportunity  for  maneuver. 


A  STUDY  IN   BATTLE   FORMATION. 


35 


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o 


is 


lOw-12,'23 


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Makers 

•/use,  N.  Y. 
"  PAT.  JAM.  21, -1908 


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